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The Mental Health Act 2007
– The Defeat of an Ideal
Rowena Daw1
This short account of the history of the reform of the Mental Health Act covers the main issues that divided
the participants in the process, and the flawed legacy that remains. It gives the background to central
provisions of the 2007 Act as they were amended during the parliamentary process and reflects on some
problems they raise2. It does not consider the amendments to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 to cover so-
called ‘Bournewood’ patients3, although some implications of the different regimes will be mentioned.
The Mental Health Bill 2006 has now reached the statute books. It bears the scars of its tortured history:
an ideological warfare conducted between the government and everyone else over a seven year period
ending with a torrid passage through Parliament where the outcome was decided, inevitably, by a Labour
majority in the House of Commons.  
In the House of Lords, Conservatives, Liberal Democrats and Crossbenchers under the expert leadership
respectively of Earl Howe, Baroness Barker and Lord Williamson had united in their opposition to the
core of the Bill. Collectively they commanded formidable expertise4. They were informed by the report of
the Joint Scrutiny Committee into the 2004 Bill5, legislative scrutiny reports from the Joint Committee
on Human Rights6 and by the research of the Mental Health Alliance7 and other stakeholders. To these
were added, in the last stages, the Institute of Psychiatry report on the international experience of
community treatment orders8 and the written and oral evidence presented to the Public Bill Committee
1  Vice-chair, Mental Health Alliance. Rowena Daw was 
a legal adviser to the opposition throughout the Mental
Health Bill debates in Parliament. She worked on the Bill
at Mind and later as consultant at the Royal College of
Psychiatrists during most of the period covered by this
article, but the views expressed are personal to her. The
author is grateful to Mat Kinton (Senior Policy Analyst,
Mental Health Act Commission) for his editorial
assistance.
2 For an excellent account of the detailed provisions of the
Act, see Mental Health Act Commission Mental Health
Act 2007, Policy Briefing for Commissioners, July 2007
www.mhac.org.uk.
3 Introduced by section 50 Mental Health Act 2007.
4 They included Lord Carlile (Chair of the Scrutiny
Committee); Lord Patel (Chairman of Mental Health 
Act Commission) Baroness Neuberger (Former Chief
Executive Kings Fund) Lord Adebowale (Chief Executive
of Turning Point) Lord Bragg (President of Mind)
Psychiatrists Lord Alderdice and Baroness Murphy,
Baroness Meacher (Chair of  Mental Heath Trust). 
5  Joint Scrutiny Committee on Draft Mental Health Bill
2004,  Vols I–III. 
6  The Joint Committee on Human Rights played a
significant role in the process of reform, through its detailed
critique of the 2002 Bill and then a series of Scrutiny
reports on the 2007 Bill. Joint Committee on Human
Rights, Legislative Scrutiny: Mental Health Bill, 22nd
Report Session 2001–2; 4th Report Session 2006–7;
Legislative Scrutiny: Seventh Progress Report 15th report
Session 2006–7. 
7  The Mental Health Alliance, finally a coalition of 80
organisations, was a unique alliance of: service users;
psychiatrists; social workers; nurses; psychologists;
lawyers; voluntary associations; charities; religious
organisations; research bodies; and carers’ groups. The
Alliance was established in 1999, solely for the purpose of
working for improved mental health legislation, following
widespread concern about Government proposals for a
new Mental Health Act. Some professional organizations
suspended their membership in June 2007 because of
differences of view over professional roles, although these
issues were later resolved. Remaining members continue to
work on the Code of Practice.
8  Churchill R et al (2007) International Experiences of
using community treatment orders, Institute of Psychiatry.
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in the House of Commons9. There was an astonishing consensus from all theses viewpoints. In a series of
amendments the House of Lords savaged the heart out of the Bill, only to have all their amendments
reversed by the House of Commons. In the end the House of Lords was overruled. Baroness Barker stated
that: 
the Bill is not the step forward for people with mental health problems that we all wanted, it is not the
Bill that we needed and it will not be the legislation that we need.10
Ultimately, despite the mountain of expertise, it was a mixture of serendipity, intransigence, hasty
compromises and the arcane practices of parliament, leavened to an extent by reasoned debate, that
produced the text of new law. It was a shambolic way to produce legislation of such importance for
people’s lives 
This was to be the mental health law for a new generation – the first full-scale re-examination of mental
health law since 1959. New Labour was riding the crest of the wave. The mental health community saw this
as the chance for an enlightened and up to date approach to the care and health of those with mental illness,
a chance to put into practice ideas, clinical approaches and values many of which were already common
currency in academic and professional circles. Therapeutic care and civil rights were central to this. Medical
practice and treatments for mental illness had changed, paternalism and authoritarianism was on the wane,
human rights law had developed, disability discrimination law had sprung up, professional roles and attitudes
evolved, the National Service Framework for Mental Health was being drawn up, service user groups were
alert and articulate. This was the background to the formation of the Expert Committee chaired by Professor
Genevra Richardson. Their report11 was a detailed and coherent blue print for new legislation. It proceeded
from the central propositions of non-discrimination, patient autonomy, a preference for voluntary treatment
over compulsion, and the concepts of a right to care and treatment.
Government, on the other hand, had different priorities. It was driven to legislate by its need to deal with
breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights; its wish to give flexibility in delivery of mental
health services through compulsory treatment in the community; and its fear of ‘loopholes’ through
which otherwise treatable patients might slip. In its general approach, the government followed a populist
agenda fuelled by homicide inquiries into the deaths caused by mental health patients12. Public concern
and media frenzy went hand in hand to demand better public protection against those who were mentally
ill and dangerous. Although the government dropped its unpopular policy for dealing with people with
“dangerous and severe personality disorder”, they remained obsessed with the “problem” of risk and the
need to give clinicians every power they might need to contain it. The then Health Minister Rosie
Winterton MP stated that “every barrier that is put in the way of getting treatment to people with serious
mental health problems puts both patients and public at risk”13. This conflates the need for treatment
with the need for compulsion, and is the antithesis of Richardson Committee approach under which
voluntary treatment should always be the preferred option and compulsion the last resort.14
Thus the lines of conflict were drawn from the beginning. Through Green Paper, White Paper and the
Bills of 2002 and 2004, the Government pursued these agendas, little deflected by the widespread
opposition led by the Mental Health Alliance, whose members grew to include almost all stakeholders.
9 These are published on the parliamentary website
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
10  Hansard HL 2 July 2007, Col 817.
11 Expert Committee (1999) Review of the Mental Health
Act 1983, Dept of Health, November 1999.  
12 For a detailed account see Rogers & Pilgrim (2001)
Mental Health Policy in Britain, Palgrave, Ch. 12. 
13 Rt. Hon Rosie Winterton MP, Local Gvmt. Assoc.
Conference , Mental Health Bill, 1 March 2007.
14 The MHA 1983 Code of Practice (para 2.7) also refers
to compulsion as “the last resort”.  
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Deflection came with a critical report on the 2004 Bill by the Parliamentary Scrutiny Committee chaired
by Lord Carlile of Berriew, which began with a statement that the case for reform of the 1983 Act was
not overwhelming, but made 127 recommendations which, broadly speaking, supported the approach
taken by the Richardson Committee, and the Mental Health Alliance policies. 
Meanwhile in Scotland there had been two Reports; the Millan Committee Report considering civil
patients, and the Mclean Committee Report on provisions for defendants and offenders. The Millan
Committee Report, which broadly agreed with the approach set out in the Richardson Committee Report,
had led to Scottish mental health legislation, the Scottish Mental Health (Care and Treatment) Act 2003. The
Scrutiny Committee was clearly impressed with that legislation which influenced their recommendations. 
In the face of such widespread consensus over how to improve it, the government abandoned the 2004
Bill.  Factors in this decision were the costs of the new Tribunal system; government’s failure to undertake
a Race Equality Impact Assessment on the Bill as required under the Race Relations Act, 2001 and the
Bill’s incomprehensible drafting. The Amendment Bill that followed in 2006 jettisoned some popular
features of the 2004 Bill (most notably the new process for authorising compulsion through the new
Tribunals and statutory care plans) and bolted government’s central policies on to the 1983 Act. The holy
grail of mental health law fit for a new century had vanished. 
The ideological differences between government and lobbyists made this result inevitable. Home Office
determination to detain ‘dangerous people with personality disorder’ coloured every contentious area.
Certainly, with the complexity of the issues, agreement over less contentious issues was never going to be
easy. However, had the Department of Health and the Home Office taken the stakeholders along with them
in meaningful collaboration, some improvement may have been made. There are examples of collaboration
on complex issues that have been productive – the work of the Disability Rights Task Force on substantial
reform of the Disability Discrimination Act and the work on the Mental Capacity Act among them. As it was,
positions became more entrenched as time went by, and policy making was too politicised. On the side of
the stakeholders, policy proposals were developed without an understanding of the real nature of
government’s objections to them. Frustrated by the lack of dialogue, they remained locked into positions
that were never likely to succeed. The government departments also seemed to be lodged in their separate
bunkers. The many efforts at consultation were unproductive. It was only in parliament that a genuine
dialogue occurred and glimpses of workable compromises could be seen. This was too late. The opportunity
to benefit mental health patients, their families and those professionals who care for them was lost. 
The remaining parts of this article will examine the issues that dominated the parliamentary process, and
will consider their results. 
Principles 
The Richardson Committee and the Joint Scrutiny Committee both considered it vital for the law to be
based on a statutory set of principles that would give greater clarity and certainty to the courts; guide
practitioners concerned about how to exercise their powers; and reassure the public, patients and families
that the values and principles set out in the Act should permeate how mental health services are
provided. The professional organisations and the Black and Minority Ethnic Network were united in
emphasising the symbolic importance of statutory principles in directing best practice and in helping to
overcome stigma15.
15  Briefing for the Second Reading of the Mental Health Bill in
the House of Lords, BME Network, 25th November 2006.
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Although there had been a set of principles for the 2004 Bill, there remained contention over what any
such principles might state. The House of Lords sought, as a minimum core, respect for wishes and
feelings, participation of patients in decisions, and non-discrimination with the least restrictive
alternative applying in all circumstances. However, the government baulked at even such a minimalist
list, arguing in part that it would be impossible to graft principles onto the 1983 Act, and that:  
principles may not in fact be relevant to every situation or, may conflict with each other or with the
specific provisions of the Act. What weight is the decision-maker to give to the different criteria in that
case? Is there a potential for him to be challenged because he has, for example, not complied with the
patient’s wishes?16
The result was a messy compromise. The Code shall include a statement of the principles which the
Secretary of State thinks should inform decisions under this Act, and the following “matters shall be
addressed”:
(a) Respect for patients’ past and present wishes and feelings, 
(b) Minimising restrictions on liberty, 
(c) Involvement of patients in planning, developing and delivering care and treatment appropriate
to them, 
(d) Avoidance of unlawful discrimination, 
(e) Effectiveness of treatment, 
(f) Views of carers and other interested parties, 
(g) Patient wellbeing and safety, and 
(h) Public safety17.
The 2007 Act further requires that the Secretary of State shall also have regard to the desirability of
ensuring the efficient use of resources and the equitable distribution of services18. This was explained as
being required for Wales, with its placement outside the principal list of matters to be addressed an
acknowledgement that it was not of equal weight to them. In contrast to the House of Lords’ core
principles, the 2007 Act therefore gives a long list of factors of different levels of importance. Indeed,
some of these are very important, and address matters not otherwise dealt with under the legislation. For
instance, the references to wishes and feelings and to patient participation are vital given the fact that
the patient may be treated without consent, and that the statute does not provide a duty to consult him
or her, or, in most situations, take note of any advance directive. It will be interesting to see how the Code
will word these principles, and whether, for instance, any of the robust language of the Richardson
principles will find their way in to the Code. It is also possible that their usefulness will be further reduced
by being expanded. The draft Code of Practice included19, for instance, transparency and
communication. Will any of these extra principles have a lesser weight for not having a status in statute? 
Section 10 of the Act also requires professionals to have regard to principles. This is no further than the
partial enactment of the House of Lords decision in Munjaz20 which stipulates that cogent reasons are
16  Hansard HL 19 Feb 2007, Col 897 (Lord Hunt of King’s
Heath).
17   MHA 1983 s118(2B), as amended by MHA 2007, s8.
18 ibid.
19   The draft Code of Practice was published with the 2006
Bill, but was subsequently revised; an updated Code was
made available for public consultation on 25 October
2007.
20 R v. Ashworth Hospital Authority (now Mersey Care
National Health Service Trust) (Appellants) ex parte
Munjaz (FC) (Respondent) [2005] UKHL 45. This was
the view stated by the Minster, Lord Hunt, Hansard HL
6th March 2007, Col 120.
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needed for departing from the Code, but at least its recognition on the face of the statute may give it
greater weight in practice. However, the real issue is how the courts will read the new provision. The
significance from the point of view of statutory interpretation of having “matters” specified in the Act but
the principles set out in the Code (rather than as at present simply in the Code) is not clear, and may
present a challenge to an ingenious counsel. Will it be possible to use judicial review to challenge a
decision on the ground that it was made without regard to a principle, or will these linguistic niceties
preclude such an approach?
The definition of mental disorder 
The gateway to the compulsory powers in the 1983 Act is the definition of mental disorder, which is
circumscribed by a set of exclusions. The 2007 Act replaces this definition and the four classifications of
mental illness, psychopathic disorder, mental impairment and severe mental impairment, with a wider
general definition of mental disorder as “any disorder or disability of the mind”, and it changes the
exclusions. 
Lord Rix and Angela Browning MP led an unsuccessful attempt to exclude people with learning
disabilities and developmental disorders such as autism from Part II. The new Act extends compulsory
powers to people with developmental disorders and those with learning disabilities in the same way as the
unamended Act. This leaves some confusion and overlap with the Mental Capacity Act, which (when
amended to cover the ‘Bournewood’ patients) will also cover people with learning disabilities who lack
capacity; permitting the deprivation of their liberty, including the use of a proportionate degree of force
if it is in their best interests. The clinician21, instructed by the Code of Practice to consider first the use
of the MCA22, will need to decide whether or not to opt for the regime of the MHA which has different
safeguards and lacks a specific ‘best interests’ test. It is not clear what factors (other than presumably the
degree of restraint) should guide that choice. 
The role of exclusions is to make clear what kind of behaviour, beliefs or life style should not be brought
within compulsory powers, even if they fall within the definition of mental disorder. Human rights law
requires the definition of mental disorder to be very clear in order for exercise of detention powers to be
lawful23. The use of exclusions is a standard feature of most common law jurisdictions in meeting that
requirement24 by providing legal certainty; guaranteeing individual autonomy; and ensuring that the
powers of detention are used no more than strictly necessary25.  
The 2007 Act removes the exclusions for sexual deviance and illegal or disorderly acts from the 1983 Act,
but retains a reworded exclusion for ‘dependence’ on alcohol or drugs. This, alongside the broad
definition of mental disorder in the revised Act, has two consequences: 
21  A Responsible Clinician appointed under the MHA may
not have the status to take such a decision so will
presumably prefer the MHA. 
22 Draft MHA Code of Practice, 2.10d.
23  For example HL v United Kingdom (2004) 40 EHRR
761; see JUSTICE, Mental Health Bill, Second Reading
Briefing, November 2006.
24  For instance, the Irish Mental Health Act 2001 excludes
someone who has a personality disorder or “is socially
deviant or is addicted to drugs or intoxicants”. Mental
Health (Care and Treatment) Scotland Act 2003 excludes
from the definition of mental disorder “sexual orientation;
sexual deviancy; transsexualism; transvestism; dependence
on, or use of alcohol or drugs; or behaviour which causes,
or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to any
other person; or acting as no prudent person would act”.
New Zealand excludes a person’s political, religious, or
cultural beliefs; sexual preferences; criminal or delinquent
behaviour; substance abuse; or intellectual disability.   
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 First, the Act’s definition of mental disorder covers all the diagnoses listed in the WHO
International Classification of Diseases (ICD10), some of which even the government
acknowledges to be inappropriate for compulsory powers. For instance, the binge drinker and
the casual consumer of drugs are brought within the Act, even though the ‘dependent’ person
is excluded26. Furthermore, disorders of sexual preference in ICD10 cover fetishistic behaviour,
voyeurism, sado-masochism and transvestism. The Joint Committee on Human Rights stated
their concern that a person with Gender Identity Dysphoria or transvestic fetishism, which 
are recognised aspects of private life under Article 8, might be inappropriately detained on
grounds of mental disorder. The explanatory notes to the Bill27 stated that it is intended that
certain behaviours (specifically fetishism and paedophilia) be brought within the scope of
mental health legislation for the first time. 
 Secondly, the definition of mental disorder potentially covers almost any significant deviation
from a “normal” condition of the mind, however temporary. It could cover behaviour that,
although not listed in ICD10, can be called disordered. (Nothing in the Act confines the
definition to the conditions listed in ICD10 or DSM IV, the American diagnostic manual).
Whilst the 1983 Act’s original definition of mental disorder (and, more specifically, its use of
the term ‘mental illness’28) clearly excludes, for example, drunkenness, addiction to tobacco,
and religious or political fanaticism, the revised definition of mental disorder and the new
exclusions do not.  
In the diverse and rapidly changing societies of British towns and cities, mental health professionals face
the challenge of understanding and interpreting the thoughts and behaviour of people from different
cultural, religious or political groups. The potential for misunderstanding is demonstrated in the history
of the use of compulsory powers against African–Caribbean people29. Disproportionately high numbers of
people from BME backgrounds are still diagnosed with major mental illness and detained in mental
hospitals or institutions30. Culturally appropriate and acceptable behaviour has also been wrongly
construed as symptoms of abnormality31 or aggression. Baroness Murphy suggested that the inappropriate
use of mental health powers is a continuing danger:
25  Informal Oral Hearing on Mental Health Bill , April 17th
2007.
26 The Act provides an exception for “dependence” on
alcohol or drugs but does not exclude “misuse” of these
substances. In both cases this includes a level of
intoxication that does not cause lasting harm or
dependence. Both misuse and dependence are covered by
ICD 10 and are therefore classified as mental disorders.
27 Paragraph 37 Explanatory Notes Mental Health Bill 2006.
28 Although ‘mental illness’ is not defined in the 1983 Act,
the courts have construed the phrase as “ordinary words 
of the English language to be construed in the way that
ordinary sensible people would construe them” W v L
[1974] QB 711.
29 Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health (2002) Breaking the
Circles of Fear.
30 Bhui K, Stansfeld S, Hull S, Priebe S, Mole F and Feder
G (2003) Ethnic Variations in pathways to and use of
specialist mental health services in the UK: Systematic
Review. British Journal of Psychiatry, 182, 105–116.
Morgan C, Mallett R, Hutchinson G, Bagalkote H,
Morgan K, Fearon P, Dazzan P, Boydell J, McKenzie K,
Harrison G, Murray R, Jones P, Craig T and Leff J
(2005) Pathways to care and ethnicity. I: Sample
characteristics and compulsory admission, Report from 
the AESOP study, British Journal of Psychiatry 186,
281–289.
31 See, for example, in relation to obsessive compulsive
disorder as discussed in NICE Guideline Obsessive-
compulsive disorder: core interventions in the treatment 
of obsessive-compulsive disorder and body dysmorphic
disorder (2005). Supplementary memoranda from the
BME Network (DMH 445) Academic Paper By Dr
Kwame McKenzie, Senior Lecturer In Psychiatry, Royal
Free And University College Medical School Joint
Scrutiny Committee on the Mental Health Bill, report,
Vol.II.
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In the 1970s, when I first worked in psychiatric hospitals outside the great fringe around London – what
we call the Epsom archipelago – the place was full in the back wards of people whom we had enormous
difficulty diagnosing with anything.
Society does not know what to do with other social misfits … those who are persistently addle-headed on
drink and drugs …paedophiles … religious fanatics who belong to the Moonie loonies and the like… We
know that those people are not as we would like them to be; they are not like us; they probably need some
help, but how we should help them is rather obscure. No doubt a significant percentage of them suffer,
from time to time, with mental disorder which would bring them properly under the scope of the Act, but
it is a profound mistake to include all categories of people behaving badly simply because we do not have
any other answers … I regret that I do not find it difficult to envisage the inappropriate use, perhaps well
meant, of mental health legislation for non-medical purposes, for social convenience and control –
“Get the paedophiles off the streets”. The pressure on services to find solutions to the presently insoluble
problems will be massive. Exclusions ensure that practitioners carefully consider the basis for compulsory
treatment. If there is an underlying mental health diagnosis, a person is covered by the Act; if there is no
diagnosis, it is unhelpful and inappropriate for the mental health services to manage that person32.
All these reasons persuaded the House of Lords to seek to insert into the Act a set of exclusions relating
to disorders of sexual preference (with the exception of paedophilia) or gender identity; the commission,
or likely commission, of illegal or disorderly acts; and cultural, religious or political beliefs33.
The government argued variously (and contrary to evidence from Victoria, New South Wales and New
Zealand) that exclusions would be “arbitrary obstacles to the use of compulsion”34 and could give rise to
legal challenges, or that they were unnecessary and potentially counter-productive (in that excluding
certain conditions from the definition might imply that, but for the exclusion, they would be mental
disorders within the meaning of the Act)35.
Government finally agreed to add to the principles “respect for diversity generally including, in particular,
diversity of religion, culture and sexual orientation (within the meaning of section 35 of the Equality Act
2006)”:  
This would be a declaratory statement about what mental health legislation should be in our society, now
and that society should treat with decency and dignity people whose behaviour is different and,
sometimes, difficult and challenging.36
Baroness Barker, perhaps with detained terrorists in mind, regretted that the amendment did not
expressly cover belief as well as religion: “we already have people detained under mental health
legislation, at least in part because of their beliefs”37. Given that freedom of belief is included with
freedom of religion in Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights38, there is not quite the lack
of protection that she feared. The initial draft Code of Practice stated that: 
32 Hansard HL 8 Jan 2007, Col 77.
33 Supported by the Joint Committee on Human Rights
Legislative Scrutiny: Seventh Progress Report 5. Para 1.5.
34 Hansard HL 8 Jan 2007, Col 86 (Baroness Royall).
35 See Lord Hunt (Hansard HL 2 July 2007, Col 812 et
seq) and Baroness Royall (op cit n.30, Col 84 et seq).  
36 Hansard HL 2 July 2007, Col 816 ( Baroness Barker).
37  ibid.
38 In order for Article 9 to apply a belief must ‘attain a
certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and
importance’ Campbell and Chaush v United Kingdom 25
February 1982, Series A, No.48, 4 EHRR 293, para 36.
However, the Court has adopted a very broad approach as
to what constitutes a religion or belief, from main stream
religions  to belief systems such as Druidism: Chappll v
United Kingdom 14 July 1897,(1987)53 DR 93. The
protection of the freedom of thought, conscience and
religion under Article 9(1) is absolute.
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disordered beliefs are sometimes symptoms of clinically recognised mental disorders, but in the absence of
such a disorder no-one may be considered to be mentally disordered solely because of their political or
cultural beliefs, values or opinions39.
There are few but telling examples of case law in jurisdictions with similar exclusions that demonstrate
their role in protecting patients from inappropriate use of compulsory powers because of their beliefs40.
Capacity
The debate over the place of capacity in a future mental health law was launched by the Richardson
Committee but was given impetus by the passing of the Mental Capacity Act in 2005. The Committee
founded its approach on patient autonomy. While acknowledging that exceptions might be made for a
person who was dangerous to others or suicidal, they recommended that compulsory powers should be
largely confined to those who lack capacity to make their own decisions 
The most committed proponents of a law based on capacity were an unexpected trio of the Royal College
of Psychiatrists, the British Psychological Society and Mind. They pointed to the persistence of
discrimination against people with mental health problems and its blight on peoples’ lives41. They
highlighted the link between stigma and poor health, patient choice and the better health outcomes
which NICE Guidelines42 and NHS policies43 proclaim. In their view, fairness to service users and
patients demanded that the issue of forcing treatment on mentally capable patients be addressed. 
The Mental Health Alliance proposed adopting the “significantly impaired decision making” test from
the Scottish Mental Health (Care and Treatment) Act 200544. This sets a lower threshold than a “capacity”
test, and one more capable of taking into account emotional as well as cognitive factors45. This found
favour with the Joint Scrutiny Committee and later the House of Lords.  
However, the Mental Health Act Commission raised questions over how a capacity test might work in
practice46, and government resisted calls for any sort of capacity threshold for the use of most compulsory
powers. They insisted that impaired decision-making was neither well understood, nor a reliable test, and
that it would be hard to administer. These arguments lacked weight, in that the Mental Capacity Act
(MCA) requires all professionals to become proficient in determining capacity; impaired decision-making 
39 Draft MHA Code of Practice, para 1B.5
40 For instance the series of reported cases of the Victorian
Mental Health Review Board on religious belief: [2001]
VMHRB 2 (19 February 2001); 04-057 [2003]
VMHRB 2 (27 October 2003); 98-232 [1998] VMHRB
5 (9 April 1998); HL [1997] VMHRB 17 (1 September
1997); RM [1996] VMHRB 3 (7 August 1996).
41 The Department of Health’s study of public attitudes to
people with mental illness found that “levels of fear and
intolerance of people with mental illness have tended to
increase since 1993” and that “attitudes ...have become
less positive between 2000 and 2003”. The Social
Exclusion Report 2004 found stigma to be the biggest
problem people with mental health problems face as a
group.
42 See, for example, the NICE Guideline on treatment for
bipolar disorder.
43 “Involving individuals in an effective partnership with
healthcare professionals, with all decision-making being
shared, improves outcomes”. Dept of Health (2006) Our
health, our care, our say: a new direction for community
services. 
44 The notion of “significantly impaired decision-making” is
explained in detail in the Scottish Executive’s Document:
Code of Practice Code of Practice for the Mental Health
(Care and Treatment) (Scotland) act 2003, Volume 1;
31. March 2004; Chapter 1, paras 33–38.
45 See paper “Impaired decision making” at
www.mentalhealthalliance.org.uk
46  See, for example, Heginbotham C and Kinton M (2007)
‘Developing a capacity test for compulsion in mental health
law’ JMHL 15; 72–84 .
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is a feature of other laws47, and research evidence shows the reliability of capacity tests48. Nevertheless,
the proponents of the test did not make a consistent case either.
The debate in both Houses of Parliament on this issue was impassioned and sustained, with advocates for
a capacity threshold from all political parties. The government refusal to negotiate for a test was framed
as a concern not to stand in the way of treating a suicidal patient, but the underlying fear was how it
would apply to patients with personality disorder, and the underlying assumption the government’s
extraordinary paternalistic position (in the context of a debate over the appropriate scope of mental
health compulsion) that “every restriction was a patient not treated”49:
if it cannot be shown that a patient’s judgment is impaired, they cannot be detained – regardless of how
much the patient needs treatment and however much they, and others, are at risk without it.50
The impassioned response by Earl Howe summed up the differences between the positions of government
and those calling for a threshold of impaired decision-making:
A test of impaired decision-making would do more to bring mental health services into the modern world
than just about any other change. As it is we are, in a real sense, back in the world of Enoch Powell and
1959. Patient empowerment and respect for the wishes of the patient are acknowledged features of good
clinical practice in all other areas of healthcare – but not, it seems, in mental health. …Finding a way
through this issue would have been the way to show that we wanted to banish the stigma and
discrimination associated with mental illness. To have acknowledged in law that there is a place for the
wishes and feelings of patients who are capable of making their own choices would have been a
profoundly far-sighted and beneficial change51. 
As the English Bill was in Parliament, the Bamford Committee recommended capacity-based legislation
in their report on reforming the mental health law in Northern Ireland, so that the treatment of people
who lack capacity for both physical and mental illness should proceed under the same principles52. The
Joint Committee on Human Rights has argued that there is a rational and objective justification, in
relation to decisions about treatment, for treating differently a person suffering from a condition which
seriously impairs his or her mental capacity to choose whether to accept treatment, from someone whose
mental capacity for decision-making is not so seriously impaired53. The principle of autonomy is also
included in General Medical Council principles54; standards of the World Psychiatric Association55 and
47  The principle has been recommended for Northern Ireland
and is a criterion for admission in other jurisdictions, for
instance, in Ireland, New South Wales, North Carolina,
Israel, Saskatchewan. 
48 A recent study found that a significant minority of
detained patients, particularly those who had been
detained on a previous occasion retained their capacity
(Cairns et al (2005) Prevalence and predictors of mental
incapacity in psychiatric in-patients British Journal of
Psychiatry 187, 379–85). The authors also found that a
capacity test worked with a high level of reliability (Cairns
et al (2005) Reliability of mental capacity assessments in
psychiatric in-patients British Journal of Psychiatry 187,
371–8).
49  Op cit n.13.
50  Op cit n.13.
51  Hansard HL  2 July 2007, Col 826.
52 The Bamford Review of Mental Health and Learning
Disability (Northern Ireland) “A Comprehensive Legislative
Framework “ Consultation Report, March 2007.
53  Joint Committee on Human Rights, 25th Report. Para 20.
54  “The requirement that a person’s decision-making ability
must be significantly impaired before they can be detained
and treated without their consent is consistent with the
guidance the GMC issues to doctors, in which we make
clear that doctors are expected to respect the wishes of
patients who have capacity to make their own decision
...These are fundamental principles of good medical
practice which we would expect to see applied to decisions
involving patients with mental disorders in the same way
as those suffering from physical conditions”. Public Bill
Committee on Mental Health Bill,  Evidence 43.
55  The World Psychiatric Association approved at the
General Assembly, August 25, 1996. No treatment
should be provided against the patient’s will, unless
withholding treatment would endanger the life of the
patient and/or those who surround him or her. 
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the World Health Organisation56; and above all in Recommendation (2004)10 of the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe concerning the protection of the human rights and dignity of persons
with mental disorder’57. This Recommendation represents a consensus within the Council of Europe that
is in advance of Convention jurisprudence and its application in domestic courts. The latter have upheld
treatment without consent on mentally capable patients on the basis of “medical necessity” rather than
capacity58.
Treatability
The treatability test was the single key issue in the Bill for civil libertarians, the Royal College of
Psychiatrists and some individual psychiatrists59 – and its abolition, the crossing of the Rubicon from a
health measure to one of preventive detention.  Lord Carlile explained that
there is a principle here … as a matter of medical and legal ethics and of professional ethics … no
professional person should be required to provide a service to someone whose requirements do not come
within their professional ethical code of practice. Under the Bill as it stands, doctors and other clinicians
– ar from all clinicians are qualified medical practitioners – are being asked to provide medical treatment
in circumstances in which such treatment is simply inappropriate. 
If it is the Government’s view that it is appropriate to introduce legislation which requires people to be
locked away from society because they are perceived to be dangerous but could not benefit therapeutically,
then I am sure that this House will consider any such proposed legislation on its merits. It may achieve a
fair passage and it may not. At least it would be honest, ethical legislation in which the Government
would set out their objective and we…would then consider such legislation60.
The existing ‘treatability test’ is a weak test, applied to certain patients at certain times, which sets a
threshold only that a patient is likely to respond to a very broad range of interventions. Nevertheless,
government argued that it was used to exclude from services people whose personality disorder is deemed
to be ‘untreatable’. Their opponents held that this was no longer the case, given the more widespread
availability of psychological treatments for personality disorder (whose prominence is likely to increase
under the new Act, since psychologists would become responsible clinicians in charge of treatment).
Training and the development of services will help to deliver a new generation of practitioners who are
versed in the new approaches to treatment. Professor Appleby, the National Director of Mental Health
has recently acknowledged the improvements for people with a personality disorder61. 
The Bill replaced the treatability test with a loosely worded test of “appropriate treatment” which is
“available” to the patient62. These terms significantly broaden the scope of the law. If treatment must be
simply “available” to a person, the test will be satisfied whether or not s/he agrees to be treated or is willing
or able to engage with or benefit from treatment. The Minister stated that the requirement that treatment
56  WHO Mental Health Care Law: Ten Basic Principles
WHO/MNH/MND/96.9. These include the right to self
determination covering the need for consent to medical
treatment.
57  The UK government has reserved the right – alone out of
45 member states – not to comply with the
recommendation.
58 Forced treatment is capable of reaching the threshold of
severity required for Article 3, in which case the hospital
authorities must ‘convincingly show’ before a Court a
‘therapeutic necessity’ for such treatment R (Wilkinson) v
Broadmoor SHA [2002] 1 WLR 419, R (N) v Dr M
[2003] 1 WLR 562.
59 Professor Eastman. Evidence to the Public Bill Committee,
Memorandum 62.
60 Hansard HL 19 Feb 2007, Col 925.
61  National Personality Disorder Conference, 18th January
2007.
62  Professor Eastman. Evidence to the Public Bill Committee,
Memorandum 62.
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must be “appropriate in [the patient’s] case, taking into account the nature and degree of the mental
disorder from which he is suffering and all other circumstances of his case” was much more than the
treatability test currently requires, as the medical treatment must be appropriate to the patient “as an
individual”63, but others fear that “all the circumstances of the case” will permit issues of public
protection to override therapeutic benefit. 
With government facing a torrent of criticism in parliament, a compromise amendment was passed to
require that the “purpose” of medical treatment must be to “alleviate the mental disorder or one or more
of its symptoms or manifestations”. Chris Bryant, Member of Parliament for Rhondda, who moved the
amendment, was clear that “purpose” was a robust test. It avoided the concept of “likelihood” implied in
the current legislation, and stated in previous amendments proposed by the opposition, which was
deemed too high a threshold and inappropriately based upon prediction. Nevertheless, a treatment could
not have the necessary purpose unless the clinician could show that there was some likelihood it would
succeed, and this should be evidence-based rather than subjective.  
For behaviour to be a “manifestation” of a disorder, it must be the direct result of it. The term has the same
meaning as the clinical term “signs”64. It follows that a person with a mental disorder may not be detained
because of their violent behaviour if it arises from other sources than the disorder itself, however difficult
that distinction may be in practice. How the test will be applied (perhaps especially to people with learning
difficulties) remains to be seen. However, the existing treatability test has been interpreted to allow that
the required treatment for restricted patients may be no more than containment within a therapeutic
environment under the supervision of health professionals, with only minimal benefit to the patient65. If
this is extended to all paients the new legislative wording will make little difference to practice. 
Community treatment orders (CTOs)66
The introduction of community treatment orders is the most substantial change to the regime for
compulsory treatment under the 1983 Act and it remains a controversial innovation. Significantly, it was
opposed entirely by Mind67 and by all service user groups . 
Critics claim that, by removing the limiting pressure of bed spaces, CTOs will inevitably lead to more
patients being subject to compulsory powers, will increase the use of or reliance upon medication in the
63  Hansard HC 19 June  2007, Col 1284 (Rt Hon Rosie
Winterton MP).
64  ibid., Col 1280 (Chris Bryant MP). The Mental Health
Alliance argued for “signs” rather than “manifestations” as
a term that like “symptoms” had a clear clinical meaning,
the former being that which the patient reports, the latter
that which the clinician elicits by observation. However
they were reassured that the intention of “manifestation”
was to have the same meaning in lay language. The
Minister stated that “there will be no difference between
the word “signs” and “manifestations”. It is ultimately
simply a matter of people being able to understand what it
means” Hansard HL 2 July 2007 Col 834 (Baroness
Royall).
65 A person could be detained if hospital treatment would
prevent a deterioration in his condition, make him more
co-operative and insightful, or if detention was likely to
impact on his symptoms, even if it would not touch the
substantive illness. R v Cannons Park MHRT [1995] QB
60 In Reid v Secretary of State for Scotland [1999] 2AC
512 the House of Lords stated that the definition of
treatment may in some circumstances extend ‘from 
cure to containment’. The case concerned a restricted
psychopathic patient whose anger management was
improved by the supervision he received in the structured
setting of a state hospital.
66 For further consideration of CTOs see ‘Community
Treatment Orders’ by Kris Gledhill in this issue of 
the Journal of Mental Health Law.  Also see ‘Does
compulsory or supervised community treatment reduce
‘revolving door’ care? Legislation is inconsistent with
recent evidence.’ by Kisely and Campbell, British Journal
of Psychiatry (2007) 191 pp 373–374. This review of
recent studies in Australia argues that CTOs do not
reduce revolving door care.
67 Submission to the Joint Committee on the Draft Mental
Health Bill:2004, Report Vol II.
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treatment of illness (given that the power is designed to impose medication compliance); and will
disproportionately impact on people from Black and minority ethnic backgrounds. They fear that the
community services are not sufficiently well resourced or well developed to ensure the delivery of safe and
effective care68. Government, for its part, favours CTOs for a range of reasons – that they are more
flexible; more consistent with community-based modern service delivery; less traumatic for patients than
long hospital stays; and, above all, that they will address the problem of revolving door patients. After the
outcry surrounding the 2004 Bill, the government decided to limit CTOs to any person who has been
placed on a treatment order (if only for a short time) as a civil or a Part III patient.
The Mental Health Alliance criticised the Department of Health for proceeding to legislate having
neither analysed the different models of community treatment in force in other jurisdictions nor assessed
overseas experience of such models. Although the Department of Health did commission research from
the Institute of Psychiatry, it did so too late to influence the policy making process. The Institute’s
report69, which was released the day after the Bill had completed its process through the House of Lords,
is the most comprehensive review that has yet been undertaken of the existing international research
literature on CTOs relating to civil patients over 52 jurisdictions in Australia, New Zealand, Canada,
USA, Scotland and Israel. It reviewed 72 studies from six countries and concluded that there is no robust
evidence that CTOs cause either reduction or increase in a range of outcomes, including hospital
admissions; hospital bed days; compliance with treatment; violence; symptoms; offences resulting in
arrest; social functioning; quality of life, care or satisfaction; and perceived coercion.
The 2007 Act provides that a person may be discharged from hospital on a CTO with the agreement of
the responsible clinician and the approved mental health professional that the conditions are met. As the
British Association of Social Workers pointed out, there is a lack of external oversight in this procedure.
They will be close colleagues in the same clinical team, with no requirement to bring in a professional
from outside the team as is the case with admissions to hospital70.
The conditions are very broad. If the patient has a mental disorder which makes it “appropriate for him
to receive medical treatment” the responsible clinician must decide whether it is “necessary for his health
or safety or for the protection of others that he should receive such treatment”, the treatment can be
provided without his continuing to be detained in hospital and “it is necessary that the responsible
clinician should be able to exercise the power to recall the patient to hospital”71.
The House of Lords argued for limits to be placed on CTOs. As Lord Patel expressed it:
If Parliament drafts the law too widely, the danger is that CTOs will be applied too widely. They could
even become part of the normal discharge process for detained patients generally, as a kind of safety net for
risk-averse mental health service staff and managers. If this happens, Parliament will not have produced a
measure that enables a less restrictive alternative for the effective management of this small group of
patients, but instead will have increased massively the legal coercion of psychiatric patients generally.72
68  The British Association of Social Workers commented
(Second Reading Briefing House of Lords Mental Health
Bill 2006) that “in most places there are now too few 
in-patient beds, and that there is pressure to reduce the
numbers still further in order to cut costs, resulting in
patients being discharged prematurely in order to free beds
for others who are even more acutely ill. In this context,
there is a high likelihood that CTOs will be used to
expedite discharges in circumstances where the patient has
not yet fully recovered and where they have not yet
regained sufficient insight to be able to co-operate
voluntarily with community services, and where they do not
have a history of non-co-operation resulting in relapse”.    
69 Op.Cit. n. 8.
70 British Association of Social Workers, Second Reading
Briefing, Mental Health Bill,  November 2006.
71  MHA 1983 s17A (5)(b)(c)(d) as amended by MHA
2007, s32.
72  Hansard HL 2 July 2007, Col 844.
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Another fear was that patients would remain on CTOs indefinitely. Given the broad criteria, Tribunals
would find it difficult to justify the discharge a patient if the responsible clinician and approved mental
health professional decided otherwise. The patient’s right to apply to the Tribunal to challenge a CTO,
or its renewal, would be of little value. 
The Government’s stated goal was identified to Parliament by Lord Warner as:
the continuing number of revolving door patients…who leave hospital, disengage from mental health
services, do not continue with their treatment, [until] their health deteriorates and they end up
compulsorily detained in hospital. We may have differences in view about the numbers involved, but 
that is the cycle we are trying to deal with.73
Their argument for community treatment orders also focused on cases where a person poses a serious risk
to others. This was in part as a result of the work of forensic psychiatrists such as Professor Tony Maden74. 
The House of Lords amendments, which would have limited the scope of CTOs to such “revolving door”
patients, were ultimately overturned, However Lord Hunt emphasised that the clinician must be
“satisfied of the patient’s previous history of non engagement and non-compliance that made it unsafe to
treat the patient in the community voluntarily”75. In a small acknowledgement of the issue, the
government agreed to an amendment that would amplify why it was necessary for a clinician to have a
power of recall. The Act now provides that:
in determining whether the criterion in subsection (5) (d) above is met, the responsible clinician shall, 
in particular, consider, having regard to the patient’s history of mental disorder and any other relevant
factors, what risk there would be of a deterioration of the patient’s condition if he were not detained in 
a hospital (as a result, for example, of his refusing or neglecting to receive the medical treatment he
requires for his mental disorder).76
The Minister stated that:
this has the effect that the responsible clinician must consider the risk of the patient’s condition
deteriorating in the community when deciding whether it is necessary for him to be able to exercise 
the power to recall the patient to hospital. This means that, in order to place a patient on supervised
community treatment, the responsible clinician will need to be able to show that he has properly
considered and, if appropriate, assessed the risk of deterioration—otherwise, his decision could be open 
to challenge in the courts.77
The failure to get any significant changes to the thresholds for CTOs leave the anxieties expressed above
undiminished. It should be noted that if one takes account of all the eligibility criteria for a person being
placed on a CTO, including the definition of mental disorder that is the initial gateway, then the powers
provided in this Act, are in excess of those provided in the mental health laws in Scotland, Ireland,
Australia, New Zealand, and in those parts of Canada and USA with community treatment regimes78.
73  Hansard HL 17 Jan 2007, Col 702.
74  Review of Homicides by Patients with Severe Mental
Illness. Tony Maden, Professor of Forensic Psychiatry,
Imperial College London 15th March 2006.
75  Hansard HL 17 Jan 2007, Col 709.
76   MHA 1983 s17A (6) as amended by MHA 2007, s32.
77  Hansard HL 2 July 2007, Col 848 (Lord Hunt).
78  Mental Health (Care and Treatment) Scotland Act 2003;
Irish Mental Health Act 2001; Mental Health (Northern
Ireland) Order 1986; NSW Mental Health Act 1990 ;
Victorian Mental Health Act 1986;Queensland Mental
Health Act 2000; ACT Mental Health( Care and
Treatment) Act 1986; New Zealand Mental Health
(Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992;
Ontario Mental Health Act; Saskatchewan Mental
Health Services Act; Alberta Mental Health Act, New
York Kendra’s Law: North Carolina Mental Health Act,
Florida Mental Health Act. 
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The CTO regime in USA is particularly narrow. In most US jurisdictions the use of compulsory powers
has been greatly restricted on civil rights grounds and is confined to people with a mental illness who are
at imminent danger to themselves or others79. In many cases there is no enforcement mechanism80, and
so they are comparable in many respects to supervised discharge rather than to CTO.
Several other features of the CTO regime are worth noting. There is no requirement in the Act to discuss
the making of an order with the patient or with the nearest relative, even though their participation is
essential. The conditions placed upon the patient may be varied by the responsible clinician only with the
agreement of the approved mental health professional. The Bill originally specified the types of conditions
that could be placed on the orders, which included specifying a place of residence and rules about the
patient’s conduct. In response to the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ concerns that these conditions
were unduly intrusive and could breach Article 8 rights to private and family life and home,81 the
government amended the Bill, removing all references specifying the permissible subject of orders, but
limiting them to measures necessary to ensure a patient receives medical treatment; to prevent risk of
harm to the patient’s health or safety; or to protect others82. 
A patient has no right to challenge a condition placed on a CTO and, even on an application for
discharge, the Tribunal has no power to vary conditions. An amendment to provide for a right of appeal
against the conditions was defeated, with the government maintaining that conditions that were not
agreed by patients would not be appropriate. However the experience in the Australian state of Victoria
for instance, where a condition of residence is permitted, is that such appeals are not rare83.
The Royal College of Psychiatrists84 and the Chair of the Mental Health Act Commission85 were alarmed
by provisions for the involvement of a second opinion approved doctor (SOAD) embedded in the almost
incomprehensible Part IVA of the 2007 Act. The treatment of any CTO patient (including those who
consent to treatment) will, after a month, have to be authorised by a second opinion appointed doctor
(SOAD). The SOAD is empowered to authorise such treatment as may be imposed should the patient
be recalled to hospital, and, extraordinarily, also to authorise treatment that would be imposed should a
consenting patient withdraw consent or lose capacity. This changes an essential component of the SOAD
role which, as the current Code of Practice stipulates86, is to examine the patient and make a judgment
in the light of the patient’s changed circumstances. As Lord Patel, Chairman of the Mental Health Act
Commission, made clear: 
it anticipates that a SOAD, whose role should be to safeguard against unnecessary or unsafe compulsory
treatment, will authorise the forced application of medication in circumstances that he or she cannot
foresee at some unpredictable point in the future. A patient who has developed dangerous and possibly
irreversible side-effects might have them worsened by the further imposition of medication on the
79 This results from the Lessard v Schmidt (1972) decision
which stipulated “extreme likelihood that if the person is
not confined he will do immediate harm to himself or
others”. See generally  Diesfeld & Freckelton Involuntary
detention and therapeutic jurisprudence : international
perspectives on civil commitment. (2003).
80 The Virginia Code Title 37.2.
81  Joint Committee on Human Rights Session 2006–7, 4th
Report p. 20–22.
82   MHA 1983 s17B((2) as amended by MHA 2007 s.32
83 Understood from recent discussions between the author
and John Lesser, President, Mental Health Review Board,
Victoria. The Victorian Mental Health Act permits
conditions to be placed only on residence. 
84 Royal College of Psychiatrists Evidence to the Public
Committee House of Commons MH10.
85 Lord Patel of Bradford Hansard HL 26 February 2007
Col 1450.
86 MHA 1983 Code of Practice, para 16.21.
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authority of the SOAD. A patient with a heart condition might be killed by the imposition of medication
authorised in good faith by the SOAD.87
The fact that a SOAD who certifies that a community patient consents to treatment will also certify what
treatments can be imposed on the patient if he or she withdraws consent and is recalled to hospital,
underlines the coercive nature of the CTO regime and surely breaches the principle underlying true
consent that “permission given under any unfair or undue pressure is not ‘consent’”88. 
The differences between the SOADs’ role for detained and community patients is not based on clinical
considerations or patients’ welfare, but a technical problem of the difficulty in ensuring that a SOAD can
be called quickly enough (within 72 hours) if a community patient is recalled to hospital. Other solutions
could have been found to this problem, including the use of emergency powers under section 62. 
Roles of clinicians 
The 2007 Act provides for the role of the responsible medical officer to be replaced with that of the
responsible clinician, to be defined in regulations. It is anticipated that chartered psychologists, nurses,
social workers and occupational psychologists will be included. They will need to satisfy specified
competencies. Stakeholders have welcomed this workforce reform.
The government accepted the opposition argument that Section 20 of the 1983 Act needed amending.
It was anomalous for a patient to have his/her detention renewed on the recommendation of one
clinician, when it required two opinions for the original order. From a clinical point of view, it is likely to
require a higher level of expertise to diagnose an illness once the person’s condition has stabilised than
when he or she is in a state of mental crisis and the disordered state of mind is only too evident. From an
ethical point of view, a person’s liberty should not be denied on the basis of one opinion.  
In the case of the renewal of detention, the amended Act will require that a person who has been
“professionally concerned with the patient’s medical treatment; but who belongs to a profession other
than that to which the responsible clinician belongs”, must state “in writing that he agrees that the
conditions are satisfied” before a section can be renewed89. This does not expressly require the patient to
be examined by the second professional, and in that respect it is a weaker safeguard than that to be
provided for patients deprived of liberty under the amended Mental Capacity Act90. Given that the two
clinicians will come from the same team, and that the status of the clinician giving the second opinion is
not specified, it also fails to provide the robust safeguard the opposition amendments had sought. 
It is not clear that the new arrangements satisfy the requirements of Article 5 of the European
Convention. Under the 2007 Act, the initial s.3 detention for six months is still based on the opinions of
two medical practitioners. Thereafter (where the responsible clinician is not a doctor), all periods of
detention can be authorised by non-medical practitioners. This potentially removes from the process the
“objective medical expertise of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement” (the test from
Winterwerp v the Netherlands), which is required for a valid detention under ECHR Article 5. The Joint
Committee on Human Rights have cited ECHR jurisprudence to the effect only a person with medical
87  He also warned that the MHAC would be likely to advise
SOADs to be extremely cautious indeed when considering
whether or not to authorise treatments to be given in
unforeseeable situations at some unidentified point in the
future: Hansard HL 26 Feb 2007, Col 1450. 
88 MHA 1983 Code of Practice, para 15.13.
89  MHA 1983 s.20(5A) as amended by MHA 2007, s9(4).
90  Schedule 7 MHA 2007 (referring to the ‘Bournewood’
authorisation procedures) requires the person to be
examined by a medical practitioner to ascertain whether
s/he has a mental disorder. 
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training could satisfy the Winterwerp test for deprivation of liberty91. The government disagreed; and in
their view the competencies which the responsible clinician needs to meet would be sufficiently robust to
satisfy the Winterwerp test. The Joint Committee countered this by pointing to the lack of examination
planned for those seeking to satisfy the competencies, and reiterating that in their view only a doctor or
clinical psychologist could be sure to have the requisite training to satisfy the test92. The legal landscape is
now rather uneven. Two medical opinions are required for an initial civil detention under the MHA; two
opinions (one medical) for Bournewood deprivation of liberty; two professional opinions for a person being
placed on a CTO or for a CTO renewal; but in the case of a renewal of civil detention under the MHA
only one medical opinion is needed. This is clearly an issue that the courts will be called upon to resolve.
Meanwhile, cautious authorities might be advised to include a medical practitioner in renewals. 
The overlapping regimes of MCA and MHA
That the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) and the Mental Health Act (MHA) provide overlapping regimes for
adults with a mental disorder is well known. Many incapacitous patients would be detained under the
MHA but for their compliance with their care. The acts are however based on different principles –
patient empowerment and best interests govern the MCA, whilst risk and paternalism govern the MHA.
Patients receive different standards of care and protection if they are treated under one statute rather
than the other. For instance, MCA patients who receive ECT do not qualify for a second opinion, nor if
they need to be detained under the deprivation of liberty regime will they receive free care. On the other
hand, advance directives will be respected and their appointed representatives will have a role in their
care and treatment. Their legal redress is through the Court of Protection, which is not free, rather than
through the Mental Health Tribunal, which is. Clinicians are expected to consider carefully which regime
to use, but may not have a formal legal status under both acts. 
Attempts in Parliament for amendments to bring greater consistency to the two schemes were
unsuccessful. The inconsistencies may give rise to human rights challenges93. Moreoever this still leaves
the fact that professionals are faced with two legal structures which could be used for patients who lack
capacity. Except in case of patients who present a high level of risk to others, it may not be clear what
factors should determine the choice. 
Some welcome reforms 
The Mental Health Act 2007 has made many other significant changes to the 1983 Act. Patients will be
able to apply to the county court to displace their nearest relative, including on the new grounds that s/he
is “not a suitable person to act”94. There were persistent attempts for a better solution – either to
substitute a nominated person for the nearest relative, as under the 2004 Bill, or a more user friendly
means for the patient to displace a nearest relative who had been appointed. The Mental Health Alliance
also called it “harsh and unreasonable” to expect a patient to risk causing dissension in their family by
seeking a different nearest relative when s/he was in a most vulnerable95 state. The government saw all
91  Varbanov v Bulgaria Judgment of 5 October 2000.
92  Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative scrutiny:
Seventh progress Report, Session 2006-7 15th Report
p.6–9.
93 ibid. The issue of charging and the need for a procedure
prior to the imposition of compulsion were the two issues
that concerned the Joint Committee. Others could include
the differences in treatment safeguards. 
94  MHA 1983 s29(3)(e) as amended by MHA 2007
s23(5)(b).
95  M H Alliance Memorandum, Joint Committee on Human
Rights, 4th Report Session 2006–7, p.76.
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alternative proposals as unworkable. However they did concede that a person could be “unsuitable” to
act for reasons other than abusiveness. The Minister explained that:
concerns have been expressed about whether the provision would cover situations where patients have no
real relationship with their nearest relative. Although it is important that the courts look at each case on
its merits we intend the idea of unsuitability to cover situations where there is no effective relationship
between the patient and their nearest relative or where that relationship has broken down irretrievably.96
JUSTICE was also concerned about the converse situation in which the word ‘unsuitable’ might be used
by the local authority to justify removal of a nearest relative: 
we note that nearest relatives frequently have a tense relationship with those detaining and treating
patients, and we have serious concerns that applications may be made to remove a nearest relative on the
basis of suitability, when, in essence, the detaining/treating authority is making the application on the
basis that they are ‘difficult customers’.97
The courts and Code of Practice will be relied upon for guidance with this issue. 
The right to advocacy, although not directly enforceable, is a huge gain for patients if the resources that
have been promised are made available98. There are significant gains for children and young people. Age
appropriate facilities will in time be required for all patients under 18 years99. The capacitous refusal of
16- and 17-year-olds to hospital admission will not be overridden by parental authority100, a second
opinion appointed doctor will need to agree for ECT to be administered to any detained patient under
18-years-old101, and there will be an annual referral to the Mental Health Review Tribunal for patients
under 18 years old who do not request a hearing102. There will be no ECT in the face of capacitous refusal
of any patient, other than in an emergency, and emergency ECT will only be permitted if immediately
necessary to save life or immediately necessary to prevent a serious deterioration in his condition103.
Lost opportunities
There is no doubt that the 2007 Bill was improved in its course through Parliament. The extremes of the
government’s zeal that nothing should stand in the way of clinical discretion were tempered and patient
safeguards were improved. Nevertheless, it remains simply an amending Bill and, as such, a valuable
opportunity lost. No government is likely to re-enter the minefield of mental health law reform in a hurry.
Progressive reforms including, above all, the recognition of statutory care plans and advance directives,
and a right to assessment of mental health needs, were all in the Richardson Committee framework and
were all supported with enthusiasm in Parliament, but were all dismissed summarily by the government.
96  Hansard HC 18 June 2007, Col 1099 (Rt Hon R
Winterton MP).
97  JUSTICE, Second Reading Briefing, House of Lords ,
November 2006.
98  Independent Mental Health Advocates will be available
for all patients liable to be detained whether under Part II
or Part III of the Act, being placed under guardianship or
on a CTO, if discussing section 57 type treatments, for
minors under 18 years of age and in discussing section
58A type treatments.
99  The managers of the hospital must ensure that the
patient’s environment in the hospital is suitable having
regard to his/her age (subject to his/her needs). The
managers shall consult a person who appears to them to
have knowledge or experience of cases involving patients
under 18 years old. Section 140 has been amended 
(duty on health authority to inform social services of
arrangements) for the provision of accommodation for
patients who have not attained the age of 18 years.  
100 MHA 1983 s131(2) as amended by MHA 2007 s43.
101 MHA 1983 s58A as amended by MHA 2007 s27.
102 MHA 1983 s68(6) as amended by MHA 2007 s37.
103 MHA 1983 s58A as amended by MHA 2007 s27.
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In addition, a whole raft of amendments104 which were designed to make good defects or gaps in the 1983
Act were rejected without seriously considering their merits, on the grounds that there was no intention
to undertake a wider revision of the 1983 Act. This underlined the unsatisfactory nature of the reform
process.
There remain significant unresolved issues that may give rise to expensive human rights cases; there are
difficulties in harmonising the two parallel statutes; and, above all, there is the uncertainty as to the
operation of community treatment orders. Predictions as to the use of community treatment orders vary
greatly105 and the impact of new clinical roles on rates of detention is unknowable. It is unlikely that the
Code of Practice can rescue these difficulties.  
Indubitably the Mental Health Act 2007 has broadened the scope of compulsory powers in hospital and in
the community and is likely to lead to a greater use of compulsion in the treatment of mental illness. In
the context of the ‘blame’ culture, where every tragedy caused by a patient can potentially be attributed
to a psychiatrist’s misjudgement, psychiatrists often feel required to recommend the detention of patients,
perhaps against their better judgement or the best interests of the patient. Apart from the considerable
disquiet this arouses from the point of view of patient’s welfare, there is a fear that this will impose strains
on a system where new and successful services are already struggling to survive, and that it will take away
resources from voluntary patients – both in terms of bed space and professionals’ time in dealing with the
procedural requirements of the Act. 
Ultimately it will depend upon clinical practice whether the words of Earl Howe are borne out: 
In this, as in other ways, the whole approach of the Bill views mentally ill people as patients who need
compulsory treatment for their own good, whether they like it or not. Compulsion is, of course, necessary
for many patients. But we need to remember – I do not think that some doctors always do – that it
should always be a last resort. The Government say that every limitation on the ability of doctors to
detain patients against their will has the effect of preventing those patients receiving the treatment that
they need. To put the matter in those terms, however, presupposes that compulsion is the only means by
which effective treatment can be delivered. Of course, it is not: good treatment is available without
compulsion, and the fear of some of us is that the wider the gateway to compulsion and the easier the law
makes it to get people through it, the less likely it is that those who need help will come forward to ask for
it. Never let us forget the anguish, trauma and humiliation involved in subjecting a patient to compulsion
–and never let us forget, as the RCN has emphasised, that compulsion should never be seen as a
substitute for good healthcare.106
104 For example, providing for a right to move hospital; a duty
of a Trust to act on a request for transfer to hospital from
prison; the right to order a mental health report for an
accused person remanded on bail. 
105 The Department of Health assumed that in the first year,
2% of detained s3 patients in England and Wales may 
be discharged to a CTO. However, if the experience of
Scotland is replicated – where in the first six months 23%
of all hospital-based orders were varied, upon patient
discharge, to a CTO – this is a significant underestimate.
Lawton-Smith S (2005) A Question of Numbers.
London: King’s Fund. The current King’s Fund estimate 
is between 7,800–13,000 CTOs in 10–15 years time
(Briefing for Second Reading Mental Health Bill, Kings
Fund 2006).
106 Hansard HL 2 July 2007, Col 826.
